Abstract
Introduction
The research presented in this paper explores the borders and limitations of modern standardization in the context of developing a pan-Norwegian standard for electronic patient record systems (EPR). An EPR is a computer-based information system for storing and presenting patient clinical data in hospitals. 2 We interpret the failed effort to replace the fragmented (mostly paper-based) patient record and information system collage with one integrated electronic record system as an inherent element and outcome of the complexity of standard setting. Moreover, we show that standardization processes can be reflexive, resulting in outcomes antagonistic to the original aim. For example, standard setting in EPR eventually produced a more fragmented record and IS portfolio.
We will interpret this case and its narrative by highlighting the complexity of the standardization effort. Our theoretical tool in this interpretive act is actor-network theory (ANT) combined with the concept of reflexivity adopted from the theories of risk and reflexive modernization (Beck 1986 (Beck , 1994 (Beck , 1999 Beck, Bonss, and Lau 2003; Beck, Giddens, and Lash 1994; Giddens 1991) . The mobilized concept of reflexivity reveals unexpected side effects and how such side effects can trigger new actions which will have their own side effects, and so on. Initial actions with good intentions may lead to self-destructive processes in which side effects propagate and are "reflected" back on their origin, resulting in the opposite of what was initially intended.
The paper makes three key contributions. First, it demonstrates the socio-technical complexity of IS standards and standardization efforts. Second, it provides an empirical case showing how this complexity may generate reflexive processes that undermine the initial aims of standardization. Third, the paper suggests a theoretical interpretation of this phenomenon by means of complexity theory and the theory of reflexive modernization.
The paper is structured as follows. First, we show how the development and implementation of an EPR can be seen as a standardization process and how such a standard can be considered a complex system. Second, we present our theoretical framework, conceptualizing standards as complex socio-technical systems. Third, our research design and methodology are outlined. Fourth, our case is presented, followed by analysis and discussion, including implications and conclusions.
EPR Standardization and its Complexities
Electronic patient record systems can be used by individual doctors, as a common system in a clinical department, as a shared, common system in an entire hospital, or even among a set of interconnected hospitals. An EPR can be an off-theshelf product, a proprietary system, or (as in our case) a system codeveloped by a group of hospitals and a vendor. An EPR system is used to specify, routinize, and make uniform the type and format of clinical information to be collected. Moreover, the ERP system is meant to support coordination and cooperation between departments, professions, medical specialities, and hospitals. A hospital-wide EPR could reduce redundancy and inconsistency of patient information, since the information is stored in a single location, accessible from any place at any time. Standardization activities aim to define the appropriate design of the EPR as an information system (e.g., with respect to fundamental architecture, access control, and data storage). In order to allow new users to quickly begin using the system or to avoid fumbling in emergency situations, standardization of user interface and data presentation is advocated. However, an EPR can be also be conceptualized as a package of standards. It builds on existing technical standards (e.g., with respect to operating systems, databases, and network standards). It embeds clinical procedural and performance standards as well as numerous classification schemes and terminologies (Timmermans and Berg 2003) . These standards go beyond the EPR system as such.
We conceptualize the EPR standardization attempt as a process of alignment. Successful standardization entails the achievement of stabilization and closure in the definition and boundaries of the standard (Bijker 1993; David and Greenstein 1990; Law and Bijker 1992) . This is not easily achieved because of the socio-technical nature of standards, as well as the number and variety of standards and their interrelations (Bowker and Star 1999; Brunsson and Jakobsson 2000; Fomin et al. 2003) . In our case, a number of different actors were involved, both within the individual hospitals and inside and outside the consortium or national project.
Delineating the intricacies involved in standard development processes, de Vries (2003, p. 155 ) defines standardization as the activity of establishing and recording a limited set of solutions to actual or potential matching problems directed at benefits for the party or parties involved balancing their needs and intending and expecting that these solutions will be repeatedly or continuously used during a certain period by a substantial number of the parties for whom they are meant.
Taking this definition as a reference, we submit that the observed phenomenon reported in the case study can be seen as a process of standardization (de Vries 2003, p. 156) for the following reasons:
(1) The activity was aimed at finding a common set of information needs to be addressed by balancing possible differences and views.
(2) The clear aim was to create a single solution (with the possibility of some degree of adaptation) to be shared by hospitals and, internally, by clinical departments.
(3) The intended solution was aimed at addressing a set of matching problems, that is, at harmonizing the problem of collecting, presenting, and sharing clinical information between departments and possibly hospitals.
(4) The development was a clear long-term investment aiming at achieving a shared and long-lasting electronic solution to recording, storing, and sharing clinical information.
We also propose that it is appropriate to conceptualize the EPR standard as a complex system. We do so by means of Schneberger and McLean's (2003) definition of complexity as dependent on the number of different types of components, the number of types of links, and the speed of change of the system. As noted above, a standardized EPR system includes or builds on a large number of different standards that define very different types of objects. These individual standards embed a wide range of different work practices and are developed by many different standardization bodies that include a range of different user groups and technical expertise. Further, the standards contain a large number of different types of links and relations between these elements, and, as will be demonstrated later in this paper, many of the individual components and their relations are rapidly changing. The EPR system standard is also in line with Cillier's (1998) more detailed definition of a complex system as one made up of a number of elements interacting in a dynamic and nonlinear fashion, forming loops and recurrent patterns involving both positive and negative feedback; it is open in the sense that it is difficult to define the borders between it and other systems; it has history (i.e., its past is coresponsible for its present as well as its future); and each element is ignorant of the system as a whole, responding only to information available locally. This broad definition will underlie our conceptualization of the systemic nature of the EPR throughout the paper.
Standards, Socio-Technical Complexity, and Reflexivity
The socio-technical complexity of IS standards has been studied from a variety of perspectives. One strand has primarily addressed the role of network externalities, in particular focusing on how these make standards increasingly difficult to change as their installed base grows (Shapiro and Varian 1999) . Another strand has focused on the complexity, including local specificity and variety, of work practices and organizational structures, and embedding them into standards (Bowker and Star 1999; Forster and King 1995; Hanseth and Monteiro 1997) . A third strand has addressed the increased heterogeneity of the actors involved in standardization on the one hand, and increased speed of technical change on the other, and the resulting challenges to standards setting. These perspectives favor industry consortia over traditional, formal standardization bodies as a preferred institutional framework for standards setting (Hawkins 1999; Shapiro et al. 2001; Vercoulen and van Weberg 1998) .
Overall, these studies highlight the complexity of IS standards and standardization dynamics. We suggest moving one step further by looking at the interdependencies and interactions between forms of complexities which can lead to reflexive (i.e., the combination of self-reinforcing and self-destructive) processes. The theoretical framework upon which we will draw is based on actor-network theory (ANT), primarily developed and used to analyze the alignment of social networks or, in our context, making order in a complex world. This world includes human and nonhuman, or technological and nontechnological, elements. ANT has been use to study various types of order-making, including development and acceptance of scientific theories (Latour and Woolgar 1986) , working technological solutions (Law 1987) , and organizational structures and strategies (Law 1994) . Standardization is order-making par excellence.
Central concepts in early ANT research are closure (Law and Bijker 1992) , stabilization (Bijker 1993) , and enrollment and alignment (Callon 1991) . Specifically, closure indicates a state where consensus emerges around a particular technology. Closure stabilizes the technology by focusing resistance to change. It is achieved through a negotiation process and by enrolling actors/elements of various kinds into a network and translating (reinterpreting or changing) them so that the elements are aligned in a way that supports the designer's intentions.
The early ANT studies focused on the rich and complex relations between the scientific and the technological on the one hand, and the social on the other, resulting in scientific theories and technological solutions. ANT has been used in research on the negotiation of IS standards and embedding those standards in local contexts of development and use Star 1994, 1999; Fomin et al. 2003; Hanseth and Monteiro 1997; Star and Ruhleder 1996; Timmermans and Berg 1997) .
Since its emergence in the early 1980s, ANT has evolved from the managerial approach, which focuses on how a single actor-network is aligned by a dominating central actor (Law 1999) . Addressing complexity more explicitly, the focus has turned to the unfolding dynamics of independent actors aligning with different but intersected actor-networks (Latour 1988; Law 2000; Law and Mol 2002; Law and Urry 2002; Star and Griesemer 1989) . This has happened as attention has moved toward more complex cases where order and universality can not be achieved in the classical way. 3 These cases are described as worlds too complex to be closed and ordered according to a single mode or logic. There is only partial order, interacting in different ways, or interconnected and overlapping subworlds, ordered according to different logic. 4 The interconnectedness of the subworlds means that while one is trying to make order in one subworld by imposing a specific logic, the same logic is causing disorder in another: each order also has its disorder (Berg and Timmermans 2000; Law 1999 ). Rather than alignment, stabilization, and closure, the keywords are now multiplicities, inconsistencies, ambivalence, and ambiguities (Law 2000; Law and Mol 2002) . Mastering this new world is not about achieving stabilization and closure, but rather about more ad hoc practices: ontological choreography of an ontological patchwork (Cussins 1998) . This approach has been applied to studies of train accidents (Law 2000) , a broad range of hightechnology medical practices (Mol and Berg 1998) , and interdisciplinary research (Star and Griesemer 1989) . This approach to complexity has also been applied to analyzing the challenges of achieving closure and stabilization in relation to complex IS and IS standards (Aanestad and Hanseth 2000) .
The evolution of ANT has brought it closer to the theory of reflexive modernization (Beck et al. 2003) . Latour observed the similarities between ANT and reflexive modernization, stating that a perfect translation of "risk" is the word "network" in the ANT sense, referring to whatever deviates from the straight path of reason and of control to trace a labyrinth, a maze of unexpected associations between heterogeneous elements, each of which acts as a mediator and no longer as a mere compliant intermediary (Latour 2003, p. 36). 5 From the perspective of Beck and his colleagues, the recent change of focus within ANT signals a move from the first modernity to a second reflexive modernity, 6 which is reflexive in the way that modern society itself is now modernized: the change is happening not within social structures but to them. This leads to a pluralization of modernities, a "meta-change of modern society results from a critical mass of unintended side effects…resulting from…market expansion, legal universalism and technical revolution" (Beck et al. 2003, p. 2), what we normally refer to as globalization. They define side effect more precisely as "effects that were originally intended to be more narrow in their scope than they turned out to be" (Beck et al. 2003, p. 2) .
The term reflexive connotes, in Latour's interpretation, that "the unintended consequences of actions reverberate throughout the whole of society in such a way that they have become intractable" (2003, p. 36) . Side effects can thus be reflexive to the extent they propagate through multiple, separate networks and finally become reflected-hence the term reflexive-back onto what initially triggered them. The end result can be the opposite of what was originally 3 Law and Mol (2002, p . 1) define complexity as follows: "There is complexity if things relate but don't add up, if events occur but not within the process of linear time, and if phenomena share a space but cannot be mapped in terms of a single set of three-dimensional coordinates." This definition is very brief and rather abstract, but is in perfect harmony with Cillier's definition presented earlier. 4 For a more extensive discussion of the logic of EPRs, see Gregory (2000 Gregory ( , 2004 . 5 The most substantial difference between the two is maybe the status they attribute to theories. Reflexive modernization is presented as a theory in the classical sense, describing the world "as it is," while ANT has adopted the ethnomethodological position, seeing itself as one "ethnotheory" having the same status as other such theories (Latour 2003) . 6 According to Beck (1999) , two processes of modernization of our society can be distinguished: the first, called "first" or "simple" modernization, is characterized by a stable system of coordinates as, for instance, the nation state, the gainful employment society-a concept of rationality that emphasizes instrumental control; the second, called "reflexive" modernization, is characterized by a fundamental societal transformation within modernity which revolutionizes its very coordinates and calls into question its own basic premises.
intended. 7 In ANT terms, the propagation of side effects results in the disordering of networks created by an initial ordering action.
Standardization forms a key feature of modernization. Consequently, if the theories of Beck and Giddens are valid, we should find reflexive processes unfolding in standardization. And indeed, such examples are not hard to find. Standardization is prone to escalated processes of disordering (Ciborra et al. 2000; Ciborra and Osei-Joehene 2003; Rolland 2003) . , in the context of corporate IT standards, denote standardization vividly as "chasing the rainbow."
In the following case, we will narrate efforts to standardize an EPR system. This process qua standardization unfolded as a prototypical narrative of modernity. It can be interpreted as a control-seeking process where the actors attempt to create a universal order by enrolling heterogeneous elements, and thereafter translating and aligning them into one closed and stabilized network. We will show how the order that actors sought to create was linked to multiple worlds. The ordering effects originating from each of these worlds created disorder in others. The end effect was the undermining of the ordermaking and increased disorder, what we will call reflexive standardization, where efforts and actions taken toward standardization and stability lead to an opposite result. We standardize in order to integrate, order, and control a fragmented world, and to reduce its complexity, to forge order out of chaos. Reflexive standardization, then, shows that when we try to achieve order and closeness we get chaos, openness, and instability.
Research Approach and Setting
The following research question, suggested by the call for papers of the special issue, is addressed: What historical or contingent events and factors influence the creation of ICT standards and, in particular, their success and failure? By addressing this question, the research focuses on three aspects of standardization: (1) the socio-technical perspective on IS standards and standardization as outlined above, (2) identification and analysis reflexive standardization processes, and (3) interpretation of these processes with the theory of reflexive modernization as discussed above.
The socio-technical perspective provided us with a conceptual lens that was valuable in understanding and interpreting complexity associated with standardization. In particular, the concepts of the logic of ordering, order, and disorder provided a helpful sensitizing device to interpret ordering processes of reflexive standardization. The theory of reflexive modernization, in contrast, has guided us in discerning the mechanisms of standardization that create disorder: how the uncertainties and difficulties with the standard implementation were not due to external factors, but, in contrast, were internally and reflexively produced. By directing our attention to the critical role of side effects and their production mechanisms, we can analyze loss of control in the creation of standardization situations.
We will examine these questions in the context of a case study that focused on the development of a national standard EPR system and its initial implementation in the Rikshospitalet in Oslo, Norway. This is a specialized university research hospital with about 600 beds, 17 clinical departments, and approximately 3,500 potential users of clinical information systems. We studied both the intended and unintended consequences of this standard implementation with a particular emphasis on the possible side effects of ongoing standardization actions.
Research Design and Context
The data for this paper were collected between 2001 and 2004. Other information is derived from our previous collaborations between 1996 and 2001, where the EPR implementation was the topic for Master's student projects and three Master's theses. Since 2001, the collaboration has evolved into a structured research program to study the implementation and use of clinical information systems, in particular the EPR system. To date, the project has involved two professors, three post-doctoral and doctoral researchers, and three Master's students.
The fieldwork has been structured as a longitudinal case study in order to follow the implementation process in its various stages. To gain valid knowledge for the case analysis, the data analysis and collection were grounded in interpretive principles of case study method (Klein and Myers 1999; Walsham 1993 Walsham , 1995 . In line with these principles, the focus of the research has evolved over time while the authors gathered and analyzed more data, influencing the next round of data collection, while the case progressed into new stages.
As noted the case deals with developing an electronic patient record (EPR) accompanied with the design and implementa-7 Reflexivity may be seen as a form of path-dependence. This concept has more recently emerged as influential within broader discussions of complexity theory. It has diffused from economics into other scientific fields, first historical sociology (Mahoney 2000) , then sociology and social sciences more broadly (Urry 2003) . Path-dependency in terms of self-reinforcing processes leading to lock-ins has been widely studied in relation to standards. tion of a specific product (fist called DocuLive, then IntEPR, then GlobEPR 8 ) by Alpha Medical Solutions (the medical division of Alpha 9 ), as well as the adoption of this standard via the implementation at our study site. The EPR was intended to be the electronic equivalent of the paper-based patient record. For decades, EPR systems have been a major topic in the field of Medical Informatics. Their design, development, and implementation entail considerable complexity and challenge (see Berg and Bowker 1997; Ellingsen 2002) . In our study context, EPR systems had for some years been widely used in general practitioners' offices and in smaller hospitals. Specialized and limited systems have also existed within single clinical departments in larger hospitals. However, developing a hospital-wide centralized EPR system, which involves standardizing the local systems and practices across clinical departments, is a different task. Developing generic systems for use in hospitals across multiple countries is even more difficult.
Research Methods and Data Analysis
We gathered data from seven clinical departments (out of 17), and from the archive and IT departments by following theoretical replication. These clinical departments were chosen using the implementation stage and department size as a sampling criterion. Specifically, we sought to increase variance in these conditions and therefore gathered data from departments where the EPR system had been in use for a long time, a short time, or where it was still under implementation.
We collected data with more than 35 formal interviews with 23 different employees of the hospital including medical doctors, nurses, and secretaries in clinical departments, project leaders, heads of hospital units, and senior managers in the IT department, including the former CIO of the hospital. The interviews were semi-structured and lasted from 1 to 2 hours each. Most interviews were audio recorded, and notes were taken as well. All interviews were summarized and circulated within the research group, and key interviews were fully transcribed.
Data were also collected in 18 direct observations by participating in various discussions and meetings, as well as from document analyses. The length of these observations varied between 2 and 8 hours. Observations included tracing a patient trajectory in or between clinical departments (and the production and use of information); use of the paper-based and electronic patient record; observation of individual and team work in relation to information artifacts and IT support; observation of nursing activities and use of information before and after implementation of the EPR (in the form of "shadowing"); attendance at project meetings; attendance at EPR courses for user groups; and attendance at preliminary meetings by the IT department and clinical departments before the actual implementation.
Regarding document analysis, we made use of primary and secondary sources. Primary sources of documents included EPR project documents and other material produced mainly by the managers of the IT department. We also analyzed policy documents and contracts from the Norwegian consortium project. We had full access to the intranet of the IT department, including relevant documentation on the department's budget and strategic plans. The main secondary source of document information is comprised of the fieldwork reports and theses written by Master's students during the period 1996 to 2001, and reports, articles, and theses written by members of the EPR research group since 2001. Finally, relevant data were gathered during numerous meetings between members of the IT department of Rikshospitalet and the research team. A weekly meeting of the EPR research group was organized to discuss fieldwork, preliminary findings, and further research activities. The head of research of the hospital's IT department joined these meetings at least once a month, providing continuous updates on the ongoing activities in the project and proposing new themes of research.
Finally, we note limitations of our fieldwork. We recognize that the fieldwork could have been extended to both the software company and to other hospitals implementing the same system. We approached the software company but could not reach an agreement regarding participation in the research. We intentionally decided to focus the fieldwork on the one hospital discussed herein. Through our contacts with other researchers throughout Norway, we were updated on the progress of concurrent implementations in the other hospitals.
Detailed Case Description
In Norway, work on the definition of a national standard for EPRs started in the late 1980s. A new organization, the Competence Center for IT in Health Care (with the Norwegian acronym KITH), was established with standardization (definition as well as adoption) as its main responsibility. KITH aimed at defining communication standards based on EDI (electronic data interchange) for routine message exchange 8 The names of the product and the company have been disguised. 9 Alpha is a global multinational employing about 430,000 people generating revenue of over 75 billion Euros. Alpha is engaged in diverse industries such as healthcare, manufacturing, services, transportation, and telecommunications. 92  93  94  95  96  97  98  99  00  01  02  03  04  92  93  94  95  96  97  98  99  00  01  02  03  04  92  93  94  95  96  97  98  99  00  01  02  03 10 to which the EU commission had delegated the responsibility for development of European IT standards for health care.
In the early 1990s, two of the five Norwegian regional university hospitals and a small Norwegian software company initiated a project aimed at developing an EPR system called MEDINA. A project manager from KITH was hired. At this time, KITH also started work on specifications for the Norwegian standard for EPR systems, conforming to the Norwegian standard for paper records (Statens Helsetilsyn 1993) and the CEN EPR standards as closely as possible. In 1996, the project enrolled the Rikshospitalet and the other two regional university hospitals not already involved, resulting in a consortium of the five largest hospitals in Norway (see Figure 1 for a timeline). This led KITH to see this project as an important opportunity to develop a standardized Norwegian EPR system, not just a specification of some of its elements. To do so, KITH wanted to merge MEDINA with another system, DocuLive, under development for about a decade and hosted by several software companies. DocuLive had recently been acquired by Alpha Norway. After the project organizations merged, Alpha, as the largest and financially strongest company, eventually bought MEDINA from the other vendors and took over the entire product development project.
CEN is the European branch of the International Standardization Organization (ISO).
In this new project, Alpha kept the DocuLive name and the deadline for delivery of the finalized system was set for the end of 1999.
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The DocuLive project started with the intention of involving users, acknowledging current work practices, and favoring a bottom-up development strategy. As the number of involved users grew, however, large-scale participatory development became unmanageable. After a few years, only a small number of user-representatives from each hospital continued to actively participate in the development. Moreover, the need to continuously find common agreement between the hospitals turned the intended bottomup approach into a top-down one.
Overall, the strategy of the DocuLive project can be summarized as follows:
1. The EPR should be developed to satisfy the needs of the five regional university hospitals (with the implicit plan that with the successful completion of the project, the EPR would also satisfy the needs of all other hospitals in Norway and accordingly would be adopted by them).
2. The EPR should be complete, that is, it should include all information about a patient.
3. The EPR should be realized as one shared, integrated information system for all departments.
This joint project between the five hospitals and Alpha was terminated early in 2004 without the realization of the initial goal: the implementation of a complete EPR system. The version of DocuLive currently in use has limited functionality in comparison to the project's aims. Eventual further development of the system, at the time of writing, is regulated by separate contracts between the vendor and the individual hospitals. At the regional level, four of the five regions in Norway (including the one which contains Rikshospitalet) have decided to standardize on EPR systems other than DocuLive.
The focus of our study is to analyze the role of one important factor behind the failure: complexity. We have organized the empirical material into four stories. Each story will be on one or more of the "modes of ordering" exemplified by the strategy elements mentioned above. The purpose of each is to illustrate how efforts aimed at making order interfered with conflicting orders or order-making, ultimately producing more disorder.
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Alpha and the Stabilizing of the Scope of the Standard
The first story focuses on the role of Alpha in relation to shaping the project trajectory. Alpha is a large company and its international orientation challenged the stabilization of the Norwegian standard and the creation of the EPR system.
When the project started in 1996, it was expected to have the economic, political, technical, and medical capacity, both in terms of support and competence, to establish a national standard EPR system in Norway. In the end, this did not happen because the project evolved in unexpected directions. Shortly after the DocuLive project began, the IT managers of Rikshospitalet became aware that Alpha UK was also engaged in EPR development. Asking Alpha Norway for more clarification, they found that within Alpha, several EPR development projects coexisted: at least five EPR projects were underway in Sweden, the UK, Germany, India, and Norway respectively. The IT department at Rikshospitalet realized that the Norwegian project was not at the top of Alpha's priorities since Norway represented the smallest market. Within Alpha, the DocuLive project ran the risk of being overrun by other internal projects for more profitable markets. As a consequence, the project consortium, together with Alpha Norway, decided to internationalize the project, first to a Scandinavian level, and later to a European one.
As a senior IT manager commented, The strategy of the consortium was to push the project to a larger dimension in order to secure its continuity. On the other hand, this decision weakened the hospital consortium's 11 Ellingsen and Monteiro (2003b) outline the overall history of DocuLive from the early 1980s. For an analysis of aspects of complexity in the Norwegian EPR project other the ones on which we focus in this article, see Ellingsen and Monteiro (2003a) . 12 The reader should refer to the timeline provided in Figure 1 to better follow the unfolding of the four stories.
position with respect to Alpha, since now it was not the only client with system requirements. Requirements from all other EPR projects in Alpha had to be merged and a new architecture had to be designed. Furthermore, since the original deadline for the final delivery (1999) was approaching, the project consortium agreed with Alpha to extend the time frame to include the development of the new internationalized EPR solution (called IntEPR).
At the time the IntEPR project started in 1999 (see the timeline in Figure 1 ), Alpha decided to acquire AMS (American Medical Systems 13 ), a large U.S. software development company. As a consequence, the scope, resources, and balance of the Alpha medical division changed: the division's headquarters was moved from Europe to the United States, and the project's scope became global. In this scenario, the project consortium supported the intent of Alpha to internationalize IntEPR. However, as the project became global, the IntEPR architecture was dropped in favor of a new system called GlobEPR. The basic requirements previously defined for the Norwegian customers of DocuLive were only partly supported by the new architecture.
From this story we can see the meeting of two different worlds, each with its own mode of ordering: the one of the Norwegian project for the Norwegian hospitals, and the one of Alpha and its international scope. To Alpha, achieving economies of scale by targeting international markets is a key concern. In addition, the medical division within Alpha is large, with a traditional base within medical imaging technologies. As the imaging instruments have become digital, supplementary software systems have been built. As the EPR development activities were increasing within Alpha, it became more and more important to align and integrate the EPR strategy and product(s) with other Alpha products and strategies.
Within this world, Norway becomes marginal, as the appetite for larger markets escalates in a self-feeding process. From the Norwegian point of view, the original interest in creating a Norwegian standard had to be reinterpreted in a Scandinavian, then European, and finally global context. A side effect of the expansion of ambitions and scope was increased complexity: the larger the market at which Alpha was aiming, the more diverse the user requirements and, accordingly, the more complex the system had to be in order to satisfy them. This implied that the development costs were growing, which again implied that a larger market was required to make the whole project profitable.
The Complete EPR
In our second and third stories, we look more closely into the implementation process inside the hospital. The efforts aimed at replacing the fragmented paper-based record with a complete and smoothly integrated electronic one turned out to be more challenging than foreseen. In the end, the volume of paper records increased (second story) and the patient record became more fragmented (third story). This in turn increased the overall complexity and consequently slowed down the standardization and implementation processes.
Before 1995, the main problem at Rikshospitalet (as well as most other hospitals) was the fragmentation of the medical record system: each department had its own record archive. If a patient was admitted to several departments, several records would be created, each one containing information specific to the department. In addition, various smaller local information systems, partially overlapping with the paper records, were in use. In this picture, a long time might be needed to retrieve critical information on patients. This could lead to situations where critical decisions were made without possessing vital information contained in all the relevant medical records.
In 1996, the same year as the DocuLive project started, Rikshospitalet standardized and centralized its paper-based patient records according to the principle: one patient, one record. The new centralized paper standard followed the recently published Norwegian guidelines for paper-based patient records. This centralization process was not without problems. In particular, a major complaint was familiar: the long time needed to retrieve a patient record from the central archive. Doctors also complained that, due to the centralization, the merged patient records had become less easy to browse quickly, as a lot of the information was not relevant to their specific interests. In this situation it was widely assumed among doctors, as well as IT people at the hospital, that a standardized, complete EPR system would make information instantly available anywhere at anytime, as well as avoid duplication of information and inconsistency of data.
Basically, the aim of the DocuLive project was to replicate and replace the recently standardized and centralized paperbased patient record. However, at the time of writing (autumn 2004), a full transition from the paper to the electronic record has not yet been accomplished. The DocuLive system mainly contains textual information, while much other information is still on paper forms (lab results, radiology reports, images, and other printouts from various equipment).
A manager from Rikshospitalet's IT department helped to quantify the situation: "Currently DocuLive covers about 30 13 The name of the company has been disguised. to 40 percent of information contained in an average paperbased record. Although the implementation of the EPR aimed at reducing paper and eventually replacing the paper system, the paperbased record still remained an important tool. Paradoxically, the production of paper documents increased markedly after the implementation of DocuLive. First, new laws on medical documentation required detailed records from professional groups not previously obliged to maintain a record, such as nurses, physiotherapists, and social workers. Second, for legal reasons the hospital kept the paper version of the record updated. Thus, each time a clinical note was written in the EPR, a paper copy was also printed and added to the paper record. Printout efficiency was not a design principle for the current EPR, causing non-adjustable print layouts that could result in two printed pages for one electronic page form. Third, multiple printouts of preliminary documents (e.g., lab test results) were often stored in addition to final versions. The result was that the volume of paper documents increased. This growth created a crisis at the paper record archive department. The hospital had moved into new facilities designed with a reduced space for the archive as it was supposed to handle electronic records only. In 2003, the archive was full and more than 300 shelf meters of records were lying on the floors. This situation also affected the time needed to find records, often resulting in the failure to satisfy requests.
An internal report noted that
In…2002, a daily average of 790 requests for paper records were received.…About half of the requests did not turn out as an actual delivery. There are several reasons for this. The most common are that the record has already been delivered in another department or has already been collected; that it is not possible to locate the record (due to wrong archiving); or that the archive never had the record for that patient (usually because it is a new patient). (Translated from Norwegian by the authors.)
To alleviate this situation, a scanning project was started in 2003, with the aim of reducing the amount of paper documents sent to the archive. However, even after the documents were scanned they had to be kept. One reason was that DocuLive's storage solution was not yet accredited; for that, one had to wait for release and implementation of a new version of the software. Another reason was that the existing communication and coordination of work practices were based on a flow of paper documents, and DocuLive did not yet contain the functionality that would allow the paper to be removed from the daily work practices. The result is that the benefits from the scanning activities were slow to be realized.
This story may be seen as a confrontation between what we might call "the order of computers" and "the order of paper." Computers, we can argue, are best exploited if they are allowed to work the way that fits them best: where all information is stored in a shared, consistent, and nonredundant database. However, the paper record is ordered according to different principles in order to also be an efficient tool for local work practices, and the assumption that all patientrelated information could be ordered according to the "computer order" has not yet been proven. At best, the transition period from paper-based to digital information will be long. During this period the electronic and the paper-based record have to coexist and cooperate.
One Record (per Patient), One (Integrated Information) System
The third story focuses on the relation between the new EPR system and the other clinical information systems in the hospital. When the implementation of DocuLive started, a few local systems containing clinical patient information already existed. Those systems were often overlapping with DocuLive's (planned) functionality. The original plan as revealed by project documentation was to replace these with DocuLive so as to have the EPR as one integrated information system. DocuLive should (Technical Overview Document 1998 , translated by the authors.
• create a common platform for a multitude of customized EPR modules, • [be] powerful enough to support all healthrelated information and legal aspects • [be] general enough to serve as a basis for a wide variety of hospital information systems
In this story, again,the project's ambitious plan ended up producing the opposite outcome, which contributed to inten-sifying the degree of fragmentation of the medical record. The main ordering principles for achieving the integrated record were that there should be one record for each patient, containing all patient-related information, that this record should be shared among all units within the hospital, and that all patient records should be maintained by and stored in one single integrated information system. In order to achieve this, it was planned to integrate DocuLive with a few other systems: the central Patient Administrative System (PAS) and certain information supply systems, notably laboratory systems that store and deliver laboratory test results and image archives for radiological images. The idea of entirely substituting the other local EPR-like systems was slowly abandoned. To include the functions of all these systems into the EPR would have made its development unmanageable, and users generally perceived local systems to better support their work routines and refused to give them up. For instance, as a doctor in pediatric cardiology, referring to a local system, stated,
If you have congenital heart defects, it is very likely that you have also other congenital defects. So it is a very complex logistics of patients. These two reasons, the very detailed diagnostics, and the need of keeping track of the patient, are the basis for the design of our system.
Rather than replacement, various solutions for technical integration of DocuLive with some of the local systems were considered. These intentions were realized only for a few systems, leading to a situation where users had to either perform double entries or cut and paste information between the systems. Simultaneously the number of specialized information systems were growing, based on well justified needs of the different medical specialties and departments. For example, the in vitro fertilization clinic needed a system that allowed them to consider a couple as a unit, as well as allow tracking of information from both semen and egg quality tests through all procedures involved, up to the birth of the child. The intensive care unit acquired a system that allowed them to harvest digital data from a vast array of medical equipment and thus eliminate the specialized paper forms previously used to document events and actions. Moreover, new digital instruments in use in many different departments include software components with medical record functionality.
Hence, the envisioned role of DocuLive changed from being the only system to being one among a large (and increasing) number of systems (see Figure 2 , from "Original Vision" to "Later Vision"). As the problems and the challenges with the original integration strategy emerged, the popularity of the Internet and its technology triggered the IT department at the hospital to start thinking about other potential strategies. It started tinkering with portal technology, and this led to the idea of an integrated EPR system achieved by means of a more loosely coupled infrastructure where the many clinical and laboratory systems (and DocuLive itself) were brought together under the common umbrella of a portal (see Figure  2 , "Current Vision"). The portal was part of a larger change in strategy which went under the acronym CSAM: Clinical Systems All Merged. Thus, while visualization and access to the systems were integrated, the systems themselves did not need to be integrated with each other.
This story shows, again, how the world of DocuLive and its order was confronted with other worlds with different orders and ongoing ordering processes. Different medical specialties focus on different types of information (in particular when dealing with specialized or tertiary hospitals like the one in this case). The ordering principle of "one patient, one record" is non-problematic for many, but may interfere with and create disorder for others. As a result, the attempt to achieve a tightly coupled integration of systems (in view of the logic of ordering of DocuLive) clashes with different logic, which reflects the actual complexity and diversity of the work practices to be standardized. From this clash-this interference of order-comes the generation of a new logic, implicit in the portal strategy CSAM.
To a certain degree, the novel portal strategy appears promising. It is a less strict and accordingly a more flexible way of standardizing and ordering. It seems more likely that this IS strategy can deliver a complete system for accessing information. To implement such a strategy is far from trivial or without risk. It entails further development work, as adapters need to be developed between the portal software and the different applications. Moreover, the laws and regulations concerning documentation of patient information are clearly based on the envisioned, all-encompassing EPR. One complete patient record is recognized to be the legal document, while the idea of keeping information in different sources as the CSAM strategy proposes is legally problematic: not all of the underlying systems are designed with adequate security of patient data in mind; therefore, they do not conform to the standards of the privacy laws, neither when it comes to access control solutions nor long-term storage of confidential data.
The Role of the Regional University Hospitals Revisited
The fourth story describes how a health sector reform in Norway interfered with the ongoing EPR standardization process. When the DocuLive project started, new procedures and technologies were usually developed or first adopted by the five university hospitals, and subsequently by the other hospitals. The standardization of the EPR was expected to follow this pattern, but a major reform in the health sector, initiated in 2001, affected the standardization process significantly.
Before the reform, hospitals in Norway were owned by the country's 19 counties. There was a widely held view that the health system was too fragmented, did not encourage smooth collaboration, and did not maintain a rational division of labor. The reform implied that the government was taking over ownership of all hospitals by means of five regional health enterprises, which again owned the individual hospitals. The reform significantly altered the dynamics in the sector. As a health enterprise, each region had to define costefficient and effective strategies to realize benefits of scale. A key concern was then to standardize on IT, and specifically to select one standard EPR system among the three systems in use. Inevitably, this created competition among the hospitals for each to have its own EPR system prevail over the others.
At this point, the DocuLive system progressed slowly due to continuously emerging new elements and demands originating from Alpha's activities and shifting strategies. In this situation, the IT department at Rikshospitalet attempted to market DocuLive as the standard system to be adopted by other hos-pitals, even though its development was far from complete. Moreover, Rikshospitalet sought to become the reference center for delineating and implementing regional IT strategies. However, this strategy of promoting DocuLive soon changed, as the IT department at Rikshospitalet acknowledged its rather weak position in the regional "battle of systems" (Hughes 1983 ). Accordingly, they made a strategic move, promoting the portal concept rather than DocuLive. This turned out to be a more flexible and robust strategy in order to enroll the other hospitals in the region into a collaborative rather than competitive standardization effort. The strategic move to promote the portal strategy also implied that DocuLive would no longer be the standard EPR (although it would still be a product).
Analysis and Discussion
In this section we discuss the complexities that this case exhibits, and identify three research contributions. First, we show the socio-technical complexity of IS standardization by highlighting how the standardization was shaped by the different orders, multiple actors at play, and the interference between orders that created disorder. Second, by analyzing how disorders may undermine the creation of a possible stable ordering logic or solution and of a closure of the standard, we show how this complexity generates reflexive mechanisms. We call this phenomenon reflexive standardization. Third, we discuss how the reflexive mechanism is an instance of the complexity inherent in IS standardization, and we contrast our findings with traditional approaches to IS development and standardization.
Interference and Propagation of Side Effects
The four stories presented above provide an account of the multiplicity of perspectives, intentions, constraints, challenges, and agendas at work in the socio-technical network of the standardization process. As Law points out, orders are not "simply told, performed and embodied in agents, but rather they speak through, act and recursively organize the full range of social materials" (1994, p. 109) . This perspective helps us to go beyond the intentionality of single actions and to see how ordering logics are embedded in heterogeneous social networks. Thus, their character is contingent and, in part, a matter to be determined empirically (Law 1994) .
Different orders interact with and reorganize one another: they may create disorders, or reinforce existing orders. While it is true that standardization processes may eventually stabilize-we have a large number of standards embedded in our practices-this case suggests that, under certain circumstances, interferences between orders will reflexively produce additional interferences with greater complexity, which will ultimately destabilize the initial order.
In the first story, we see how the two main actors, Alpha and the Norwegian EPR project, mutually and iteratively redefined their aims, strategy, and design of the standard as the project gradually escalated to a global level. The overall result of this dance of orders and redefinition of interests was that the Norwegian standardization project, as initially conceived, did not succeed. The second story highlights conflicts between (the order of) the electronic patient record and (the order of) the paper-based record. As a result, the strategy for creating an integrated record created, as an unintended consequence, a more fragmented one. The third story illustrates how the ordering principle of "one record (for each patient), one integrated information system" created disorders in terms of making it more difficult for workers to have easy access to the specific information they needed. The final story illustrates how a new order enforced by the government interfered with the ordering principles of the project.
The failure of DocuLive, at least as a standardization story, can be seen as a failure in attempting to control complexity. Arguably, the main mistake was to follow a traditional standardization approach-typical for (first) modernity; that is, overemphasizing criteria of universality, uniformity, and centralization of control to achieve alignment, stabilization, and closure. In line with our theoretical framework, our case data suggest that the complexity defines standardization as the emergence of multiplicities, inconsistencies, ambivalence, and ambiguities (Law 1999; Law and Mol 2002) . Ironically, what happened was the opposite of the initial aim. When actors tried to stabilize the standard by enrolling more actors, it became less stable. Attempts to improve fragmented records by means of one integrated EPR made the records more fragmented. The complexity of DocuLive turned out to be one where the ordering efforts created disorder. The side effects triggered new ones, which again were reflected back on the origin. The standardization process turned out to be reflexive and self-destructive. The dynamics of reflexive processes at work are summarized in Figure 3 .
The concept of reflexivity offers an interpretation of the dynamics of the case. The theory of high modernity helps to observe how the logics of the first industrial modernity find their limits weakness of such an approach becomes visible when the control itself reflexively reproduced the complexity, thus creating the immanent paradox of modernity Reflexive standardization seeks to highlight the need to develop alternative standardization approaches that better overcome the paradoxes to deal with complexity, as discussed below.
On the Validity of the Case Analysis
We have so far attributed the failure of the standardization effort to the inherent complexity of the standardization process and the ways in which the complexity was addressed. But this may not be the only possible explanation. It may be argued that the effort failed because of poor project management, insufficient user participation, incomplete requirements specifications, bad decisions, historical circumstances, following the wrong standardization approach, and so on. In our view, a standardization effort like the one described here almost never fails for one reason only. We do believe that the EPR project management followed strategies and made decisions that were well in line with "best practices" in software engineering, based on traditional standardization models. Without doubt, questionable decisions were made. Yet, we think that improved user participation or requirements specifications would not have saved the effort. In a similar vein, sophisticated risk management methods would not have been of much help; rather they, most likely, would have added to the overall complexity and triggered new reflexive dynamics. In fact, when dealing with complex phenomena, we will always be confronted with unpredictable events and problems (Perrow 1999) . We think that a different approach to complexity could have improved the chances of a successful standardization effort. Still, the people involved are not to blame. Rather, we submit, the problem is the poor understanding of complexity and standardization within the software engineering, information systems, and standardization fields.
With regard to the external validity of our case, we can ask: Is our case representative of a new class of standardization problems? We believe so, especially in the health care domain, where plans for developing electronic health records grow continuously bigger and more ambitious. For example, in his 2004 State of the Union address, George W. Bush Jr. envisioned "an EHR for all Americans within the next decade" (White House 2004) . In addition to building a national health information infrastructure, establishing data interoperability and comparability for patient safety data is seen as crucial. This is expected to be facilitated through adopting standards that allow medical information to be stored and shared electronically while assuring privacy and security. Similarly, the British "Connecting for Health" initiative proposes to establish the NHS (National Health Service) Care Record Service. For each individual patient the Patient Clinical Record will be used to deliver direct patient care, and in addition a centralized database ("The Spine") will contain a National Summary Record in order to support urgent and emergency care (NHS 2005) . For both initiatives, huge challenges can be recognized and critical voices emanating from our analysis can predict significant obstacles. However, from official documents and presentations of these projects, the general perception of standards is the value of increased control: developing and adopting standards is definitely seen as part of the solution rather than part of the problem.
We do not claim that standardization of medical information systems is impossible or undesirable. Because our case study site is a specialized hospital, it represents a paradigmatic example of the socio-technical complexity arising from the close intertwining of technical standards with local and highly professional work practices (in terms of professional disciplines and geography). To some extent our case represents a general class of problems associated with the interactions between the complexity of information infrastructures, information processing, and local work practices. Thus, the common shared complexity in these classes is the immense heterogeneity and multiplicity of actors involved and the need to coordinate and standardize their behaviors. Not surprisingly, challenges associated with complexity similar to those described here have been identified in multiple areas including enterprise resource planning (ERP) systems, corporate IT infrastructures in the oil and chemical industry (Ciborra et al. 2000; , the financial sector (Ciborra and Osei-Joehene 2003) , ship classification (Rolland 2003) , and e-government (Ciborra 2003) . All these are responses to a "quest for integration" (Dechow and Mouritsen 2005) and will unavoidably lead to increases in IS complexity. Accordingly, we believe that the reflexive processes as illustrated here will grow in number and importance.
Implications for Research and Practice
What are the implications of our findings for practice? Significant research efforts into the complexity of IS standards and their dynamics are called for before detailed concrete advice can be given. We agree with the authors of the British Computer Society report (BCS 2004 ) that complexity is the single most important issue for software engineering and information systems design. Research on the "duality of standards" regarding complexity (i.e., how standards may reduce as well as increase complexity) forms an important part of this. Further research is needed on specific reflexive effects of complexity in different situations. Here, we will offer only tentative answers to this question. In doing so, like Perrow (1999) , we assume that identified problems are inherent to complex systems and better structured methodologies or management tools for control will not solve them. To address such problems, we need to avoid creating complex systems.
Avoiding the kind of socio-technical complexity we have pinpointed may be possible by resisting the temptation to gain perfect order. The case study of the development of an EPR standard illustrates that traditional engineering approaches are risk prone in complex areas like designing technologies that span multiple work practices. These approaches tend to overestimate the universality of work practices, thus seeking order by simplification and abstraction and putting strong emphasis on design criteria such as consistency, completeness, and nonredundancy. These are all sound engineering principles and central to modernity. These criteria have been explicitly emphasized within the development of IT standards for health care (De Moor et al. 1993; McDonalds 1993) . They all work well if we can start out by delimiting a part of the world that can be treated as closed and in isolation. But they can become a risk if and when such assumptions do not hold as identified in failures of IS-related standards in various areas (Graham, Lobet-Maris, and Charles 1996; Graham et al.1995; Hanseth and Monteiro 1997; Hanseth et al. 1996) . In the case of IS standards-making, the closer the object of standardization is to local work practices, and the more knowledge-intensive the work practice (e.g., a specialized hospital), the less likely the traditional approach will succeed, possibly generating a reflexive self-destructive process. As Law (2000, p. 14) notes, "the search for system perfection is not only impossible but, more strongly, it may be self defeating." We need to accept in our standard making that our complex worlds are populated with a multiplicity of orders that are inconsistent. We need to be able to live with such multiplicities and inconsistencies. We need to master the trade of what Cussins (1998) calls "ontological choreography."
Another key element of a strategy accepting a multiplicity of orders is to identify subworlds that can be properly ordered and interfer with each other as little as possible; that is, make subworlds that are loosely coupled (Perrow 1999) . Maintaining loose coupling between the social and the technical is perhaps the most important strategic element. What should be avoided is embedding specific working practices into the standards. To do so, one needs to be well aware of the local specificity of work practices, and the fact that the practices are embedded into the technology.
Another way to reduce socio-technical complexity is to reduce the organizational complexity that results from the large number and heterogeneity of actors and their interdependencies. This is caused by the reach and range (Keen 1991) of the standard, which we see as a key source of its technical complexity. One strategy to reduce the scope is to split the standard into separate and independent packages, each of which has a more restricted reach and range. Rather than one universal standard in which the elements are tightly coupled, we should aim at a multiplicity of simpler standards that are loosely coupled. Such loose coupling between standards and the infrastructures based on them can be achieved by means of gateways (Hanseth 2001) . In the domain of EPR systems, this means that one should develop separate systems for different countries, and that these systems could be further split up into individual systems for specific medical specialties or hospital departments or functions. Different medical record systems in a hospital can then be integrated either by gateways enabling the exchange of shared data between them, or by means of a portal that provides a shared interface for all of them.
Complexity is a vague term. It is hard to measure. We have learned in both the natural and social sciences that everything is indefinitely complex when we look at it carefully, if we "open the black box" (Latour 1988) . Black-boxing is a strategy for reducing complexity and is closely related to modularization. It is a potentially powerful strategy, but it works well only under conditions of stability. A simple description of a complex system (in terms of an interface or an abstract specification) may be sufficient for a specific purpose. However, if the complex system is changing or the needs change, the simple description may no longer be appropriate. From this, we can derive another strategy to reduce complexity: look carefully for elements in the world-medical practices, instruments, ICT solutions-that will not change. These are the elements that may be blackboxed, ordered, and turned into standards.
The points made above can be illustrated by contrasting DocuLive with the portal strategy. The portal strategy is certainly very promising in terms of its robustness and flexibility. Its guiding principle is loose coupling between the different parts of the EPR system in contrast to the tight coupling strategy of DocuLive where all information was stored in one shared database and all functions integrated into one single software system. The portal strategy potentially makes it easy to include any kind of information and illustrations produced by new IS into the electronic record. For the time being, this strategy also embodies its risks. We do not know much about the long-term requirements of such a portal nor how to structure and design it. Such a portal can also be complex as more applications are integrated and its sophistication grows. It may become so complex that reflexive processes are triggered.
Conclusion
In this article, we argue that socio-technical complexity is a major issue in information system standardization. Through a case study of EPR standardization, we argue that critical dynamics related to this complexity relate to reflexivity. Reflexivity (Beck 1994 ) explains how, under certain circumstances, efforts aimed at reducing complexity through standardization may generate the opposite outcome. The circumstances described by the case represent a paradigmatic example of increased intertwining of technical standards with local, heterogeneous, and dispersed work practices. Through our analysis, we argue that traditional standardization approaches can not deal with such complexity appropriately. Not only will such approaches fail to not deliver the intended outcome-order-they can also lead to the opposite effects of greater disorder and instability. The need of future research on IS standardization is, therefore, critical in approaches that help mitigate the increasing complexity of IS standardization.
